



2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience

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Hybrid Conference // Venice, Italy


Hunting IoT Cyberattacks with Alpowered Intrusion Detection

Cyber Security and Resilience

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ntroduction

Introduction, Funding, Relevant Works, Challenges & Contributions



Introduction

Evolution of Internet of Things

In the era of hyper-connected digital economies, the smart technologies play a vital role in the operation of various critical domains, such as health, energy, finance

Legacy Systems

The presence of legacy systems remains a crucial issue, raising multiple threats and vulnerabilities.

Insecure Communication Protocols

The new IoT protocol create new weaknesses

Existing Countermeasures

Despite the effectiveness of existing cybersecurity solutions they cannot mitigate coordinated attacks, such as Advanced Persistent Threats

Lack of Datasets & Privacy

The existing countermeasures are not certified dynamically, ensuring their sufficiency.

Hunting IoT Cyberattacks With AI-Powered Intrusion Detection

Most of the existing works focus on IoT intrusion detection, without considering effective mitigation strategies. In this paper, we investigate potential mitigation actions with the help of Reinforcement Learning and Software-Defined Networking

Under H2020 ELECTRON

Authors & Contributors






This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101021936 (ELECTRON).

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2023 IEEE CSR HYBRID CONFERENCE // VENICE, ITALY

Related Work

Similar works securing Internet of Things



in the smart grid: temporal and spatial based detections

solutions, challenges, and research opportunities

Challenges & Contributions

Detection and Mitigation of IoT Cyberattacks



Challenges

- O IoT relies on the Internet, thus incorporating the relevant vulnerabilities
- O IoT includes a wide range of heterogeneous with their weaknesses
- O IoT handle a vast amount of sensitive data that is an attractive goal for potential cyberattackers

C1: Detection with Deep Neural Networks

Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) models are trained with the CIC IoT Dataset 2022, selecting the model with the best detection efficiency.

C2: Mitigation with Q-Learning & SDN

Given an SDN environment, a Q-Learning agent is used to indicate to the SDN Controller (SDN-C) the appropriate mitigation action



Flood Attacks, RTSP Brute Force Attacks


https://ithaca.ece.uowm.gr/

Attack Scenarios

Two Attack Scenarios



Food Attacks



RTSP Bruteforce

{RTSP bruteforce aims at gaining unauthorized access to devices or systems that use the RTSP protocol for streaming audio and video content. RTSP is commonly used for video surveillance cameras, IP cameras, and other streaming devices}

Flood Attacks

Modelling & Implementation



TCP Flood Attack

TCP flood attack is a type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack that targets a network, server, or application by overwhelming it with an excessive number of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection requests

UDP Flood Attack



In this attack, the attacker sends a flood of UDP (User Datagram Protocol) packets to a target server. Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless, so the target server does not establish a connection before receiving data. As a result, the server has to process each UDP packet individually, leading to resource exhaustion and service disruption.



HTTP Flood Attack

Targets web servers by overwhelming them with a massive volume of HTTP requests.



RSTP Bruteforce Attacks

Modelling & Implementation



RSTP – Real Time Streaming Protocol

RTSP is a network control protocol designed for real-time streaming of multimedia content. It enables the control and delivery of audio and video data over IP networks. RTSP uses a client-server model, where the client sends requests to the server to initiate and control media streaming sessions.

Brurteforce Attack



In a brute-force attack against an RTSP server or device, the attacker tries to gain access by systematically attempting all possible combinations of usernames and passwords until the correct one is found. The attacker uses automated tools, scripts, or botnets to speed up the process and test numerous combinations rapidly.



Impact of Successful Attacks

If the attacker successfully guesses the correct credentials, they can gain unauthorized access to the target device or server. Depending on the level of access obtained, the attacker may be able to manipulate the streaming content, view sensitive video feeds, or even take control of the entire device.

:~\$ nmap 10.1.3.76 -T4
Starting Nmap 7.91 (https://nmap.org) at 2021-07-19 11:48 PDT
Nmap scan report for 10.1.3.76
Host is up (1.0s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
23/tcp open telnet
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
554/tcp open rtsp

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 243.11 seconds

🖕 kali@DESKTOP-SK08UEQ: /mn 🛛 🔶 🕂 🕚

----(kali @ DESKTOP-SK08UEQ)-[/mnt/c/Users/RAJ/Desktop/javascript]
---\$ hydra -h

Hydra v9.2 (c) 2021 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do -binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Syntax: hydra [[[-l LOGIN|-L FILE] [-p PASS|-P FILE]] | [-C FILE]] [MIN:MAX:CHARSET] [-c TIME] [-ISOuvVd46] [-m MODULE_OPT] [service://

Options: -R

-I

-S

- restore a previous aborted/crashed session
- ignore an existing restore file (don't wait 10 seconds)
- perform an SSL connect


Intrusion Detection & Prevention

Architecture, Detection, Mitigation

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
Proposed Intrusion Detection & Prevention System

Architectural Design



Intrusion Detection

Detection with Multi-Layer Perceptron



Attack Mitigation



Mitigation with Q-Learning & SDN $% \left(\mathcal{L}_{1}^{2}\right) =\left(\mathcal{L}_{1}^{2$



Purpose of Q-Learning

The agent aims to maximise its long-term cumulative reward by iteratively updating the Qvalues associated with state-action pairs.



Q-value

Q-value represents the discounted expected future reward the agent will receive by taking a particular action in a specific state

Q-table

Lookup table (Q-table), where each entry corresponds to a state-action pair and its associated Q-value.



State Space: S & Action Space: A

S = {Normal State, Flood State, Bruteforce State} A = {Rerouting, Rate Limiting, Network Isolation and Notification}

INITIAL VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF Q-TABLE

State/Action	Rerouting	Rate Limiting	Isolation	Notification
Normal	0	0	0	0
Flood	0	0	0	0
Bruteforce	0	0	0	0

$$Q(s,a) \leftarrow Q(s,a) + \alpha \left[R(s,a) + \gamma \max_{a'} Q(s',a') - Q(s,a) \right]$$

Where:

- Q(s, a) is the Q-value for state s and action a.
- R(s, a) is the immediate reward obtained from taking action a in state s. γ is the discount factor.
- maxQ(s', a') represents the maximum Q-value over all possible actions a' in the next state s'. $reward = w1 \cdot (L)^2 - w2 \cdot e^{CA} - w3 \cdot \log(1 + N)$

Where:

- L is the network latency
- CA denotes the cost of each action
- N indicates the number of security events that are related to this state.
- w1, w2 and w3 denote the hyperparameters that can affect each of the previous factors.

Attack Mitigation



Mitigation with Q-Learning & SDN

INITIAL VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF Q-TABLE

State/Action	Rerouting	Rerouting Rate Limiting		Notification	
Normal	0	0	0	0	
Flood	0	0	0	0	
Bruteforce	0	0	0	0	

$$Q(s,a) \leftarrow Q(s,a) + \alpha \left[R(s,a) + \gamma \max_{a'} Q(s',a') - Q(s,a) \right]$$

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$$reward = w1 \cdot (L)^2 - w2 \cdot e^{CA} - w3 \cdot \log(1 + N)$$

Algorithm 1 Q-Learning Algorithm

- 1: Initialize Q-table with arbitrary or zero values for all stateaction pairs
- 2: Set learning rate α , discount factor γ , and exploration rate ϵ
- 3: while not converged do
- 4: Observe current state s
- 5: Choose action a based on an ϵ -greedy policy
- 6: Execute action a, observe reward r and next state s'
- 7: Calculate dynamic reward using the reward formula
- 8: Update Q-value for current state-action pair:

9:
$$Q(s,a) \leftarrow Q(s,a) + \alpha [r + \gamma \max(Q(s',a')) - Q(s,a)]$$

10: Update current state:
$$s \leftarrow s'$$

11: end while

State	Action	Reward	Next State
Normal State	Rerouting	-1	Normal State
Normal State	Blacklisting	-5	Normal State
Flood	Rate Limiting	10	Normal State
Flood	Rerouting	0	Flood
Bruteforce	Isolation	10	Normal State
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•



Methodology, Dataset & Results



Dataset

CIC IoT Dataset 2022

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Canadio	an Institute fo	or Cybersecurity	J					
*	About	Research	Members	Datasets	Contact Us			

CIC	CIC IoT Dataset 2022
About the CIC >	
Membership >	This project aims to generate a state-of-the-art dataset for profiling, behavioural analysis, and vulnerability testing of different IoT devices with different protocols such as IEEE 802.11, Zigbee-based
Research >	and Z-Wave. The following illustrates the main objectives of the CIC-IoT dataset project:
Datasets 🗸	
Webinars >	 Configure various IoT devices and analyze the behaviour exhibited.
Weblindis V	 Conduct manual and semi-automated experiments of various categories.
Global EPIC Program >	• Further analyze the network traffic when the devices are idle for three minutes and when powered
Cybersecurity Workshop >	on for the first two minutes.
	• Generating different scenarios and analyzing the devices' behaviour in different situations.
	• Conducting and capturing the network terrific of devices undercurrent and important attacks in IoT
	environment.

Current CIC IoT dataset project and activities around it can be summarized in the following steps:

Evaluation Results


With CICFlowMeter Features

AI Models	Accuracy	TPR	FPR	F1-Score			Confusion Matrix		
MLP-2 hidden layer	0.92	0.916	0.041	0.919					
MLP-3 hidden layers	0.98	0.987	0.006	0.98	0 -	4266	5	10	
MLP-4 hidden layers	0.998	0.997	0.001	0.997					
Decicion Tree	0.997	0.997	0.001	0.997					
k-NN	0.969	0.968	0.015	0.969					
Random Forest	0.994	0.994	0.002	0.994	label 1 -			_	
Naïve Bayes	0.812	0.811	0.094	0.812	21.	5	4270	,	
SVM-Linear	0.964	0.964	0.017	0.964	~				
SVM-RBF	0.966	0.966	0.016	0.966					
SVM-Sigmoid	0.82	0.819	0.09	0.82					
Logistic Regression	0.937	0.929	0.035	0.938	2 -	4	5	4272	
AdaBoost	0.911	0.91	0.04	0.911					
LDA	0.874	0.89	0.05	0.875					
SGD	0.938	0.938	0.03	0.938		Ó	1 Predicted Label	2	

Evaluation Results

With NFStream Features


AI Models	Accuracy	TPR	FPR	F1-Score
MLP-2 hidden layer	0.998	0.998	0.008	0.998
MLP-3 hidden layers	0.997	0.997	0.001	0.997
MLP-4 hidden layers	0.999	0.999	0.001	0.999
Decicion Tree	0.972	0.972	0.013	0.972
k-NN	0.997	0.997	0.012	0.997
Random Forest	0.98	0.98	0.01	0.98
Naïve Bayes	0.935	0.934	0.032	0.935
SVM-Linear	0.932	0.931	0.034	0.932
SVM-RBF	0.983	0.983	0.008	0.983
SVM-Sigmoid	0.8	0.798	0.01	0.8
Logistic Regression	0.897	0.897	0.05	0.897
AdaBoost	0.891	0.889	0.05	0.897
LDA	0.867	0.866	0.06	0.867
SGD	0.872	0.871	0.064	0.872



Conclusions

Concluding Remarks & Future Plans

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Thank You & Q/A

Contact us



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https://www.linkedin.com/in/ithaca-lab/



https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCl AuHbgmxirMxDy9zQt97Ew

Thank You

Q/A ?

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