



ELECTRON: An Architectural Framework for Securing the Smart Electrical Grid with Federated Detection, Dynamic Risk Assessment and Self-Healing

P. Radoglou-Grammatikis et al.

University of Western Macedonia


Contact: pradoglou@uowm.gr

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101021936

ARES Conference August 29 – September 01, 2022 // Benevento, Italy

MINDS





### Introduction

#### Industrial Internet of Things and Smart EPES

In the era of hyper-connected digital economies, the smart technologies play a vital role in the operation of the electrical grid, transforming it into a new paradigm.

#### Legacy Systems

The presence of legacy systems, such as ICS/SCADA remains a crucial issue, raising multiple threats and vulnerabilities.

#### **Insecure Communication Protocols**

Both smart and legacy EPES assets use insecure communication protocols that do not comprise essential authentication and authorization mechanisms.

#### Existing Countermeasures

Despite the effectiveness of existing cybersecurity solutions they cannot mitigate coordinated EPES cyberattacks, such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)

#### Lack of Datasets & Privacy

The existing countermeasures are not certified dynamically, ensuring their sufficiency.

### ELECTRON

ELECTRON refers to an integrated platform which is capable of detecting and mitigating potential cyberattacks in a timely manner, combining a set of cybersecurity and energy defensive mechanisms. The key characteristics of ELECTRON are: (a) dynamic risks assessment, (b) cybersecurity certification, (c) federated intrusion detection and correlation, (d) Software Defined Networking (SDN) mitigation, (e) proactive islanding and (f) cybersecurity training and certification



Business Logic & Architecture



## **ELECTRON Business Logic**



#### Personnel Training and Certification • AR/VR based EPES Four Main Pillars personnel training and certification Mitigation and Energy Optimization ...... Proactive Islanding, SDN/NFV-based Network Isolation and Recovery, electrical grid restoration, ELECTRON **Energy Trading Framework** Intrusion Detection & Privacy ..... PRINCE Federated Learning intrusion detection, post quantum privacy preserving, ELECTRON Threat Intelligence BRIDGE **ELECTRON Platform CYPER**

Integrated solution for enhancing the EPES resiliency, combining a plethora of technologies, such as Honeypots, Federated Learning, Visual Analytics, Post quantum cryptography, SDN/NFV, AR/VR, Crawling, MISP, SIEM, Blockchain, Mixed-integer linear programming, Deep Learning-based Islanding


#### Main Innovation Points

- Post Quantum Privacy Preserving in EPES
- Honeypot as a Service
- Federated AI Detection
- Proactive Islanding based on SDN/NFV
- Dynamic Certification & Authentication
- EPES Threat Intelligence

Risk Assessment & Certification

Collaborative Risk Assessment, Honeypots As Service, Dynamic & Continuous EPES Asset Certification & Authentication


×



# **ELECTRON Architectural Frameworks**



Architectural Frameworks and Relation with other technical WPs






This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101021936

ARES Conference August 29 – September 01, 2022 // Benevento, Italy

## BORDER



#### BORDER: collaBOrative Risk anD cErtification fRamework



#### ARMY: collAborative Risk assessMent sYstem

Collaborative Risk Assessment: Asset Identification, Threat Identification, Vulnerability Identification, Analysis of existing security resources, determining vulnerability likelihood, imact analysis, risk identification and risk treatment

#### DARCY: Dynamic Asset ceRtifiCation sYstem

Dynamic cybersecurity certification system for the EPES assets, which combines three visions: a) the vision of the certification authority, b) the vision of the manufacturer and c) the vision of the EPES-end user thus certifying continuously whether an EPES asset (e.g., RTU, PLC, MTU, smart meters, etc.) can enter or not into the production network of the EPES infrastructure


#### HaaS: Honeypot as a Service

EPES honeypots and honeypot orchestration



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101021936 CYPER





CYPER: CYbersecurity and Privacy prEserving fRamework

**ELECTRON Threat Explorer** 

A cyberthreat intelligence mechanism, which will explore and mine significant information from various web sources regarding the EPES threats and vulnerabilities, thus updating continually the **FLECTRON** SharePoint

#### **ELECTRON SharePoint**

MISP-based anonymous repository hosting security events, alerts, threats and




This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101021936

**ARES** Conference August 29 – September 01, 2022 // Benevento, Italy



# BRIDGE





# PRINCE



PRINCE: Personnel tRainINg & Certification Environment





This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101021936

ARES Conference August 29 – September 01, 2022 // Benevento, Italy



### **ELECTRON Use Cases**

https://electron-project.eu/

# Use Case #1: Addressing and Mitigating Cyberattacks and Data Leaking in Ukraine and Azerbaijan



5 Scenarios: The following scenarios will be executed in both Ukrainian and Azerbaijanis end-users.



#### **Involved Actors**



#### Scenario #1 – Spear Phishing



Preventing Spear Phishing via AR/VR Training ELECTRON Components: PRINCE KPIs: Participation percentage of the total energy personnel > 90%, . Percentage of certified energy personnel after running PRINCE > 95%.



- Scenario #2 Malware
- Detecting and Mitigating Malware
- **ELECTRON Components**: ELECTRON SIEM, ELECTRON Sharepoint, ELECTRON Threat Explorer (Patch identification)

KPIs: Malware threat detection and prevention: 99.9%, Time needed to detect and prevent the malware threat: < 10 ms



#### Scenario #3 – SCADA Control Units Hijacking

#### Detecting and mitigating Man In the Middle attacks

#### **ELECTRON Components:** STRONGBOX

**KPIs**: MitM attacks detection and prevention: 99.9%, Time needed to detect and prevent the malware threat: < 10 ms



#### Scenario #4 – Unauthorised Access Attacks

Using VPN access to get authorised and authorisation for taking control of the inner ICS systems ELECTRON Components: ARMY and DARCY KPIs: Authentication & authorisation denial of the custom VPN: 99.9%, Time to detect & prevent the malware/threat: < 10 ms



#### Scenario #5 – DoS and DDoS attacks

#### Detecting and Mitigating DoS and DDoS Attacks

ELECTRON Components: ELECTRON SIEM, FL-IDPS, ELECTRON Sharepoint, NIRO, SDN Controller KPIs: DoS and DDoS attack detected and mitigated: 99.9%, Time needed to restore the nanogrid under the attack: < 100 ms





#### 4 Scenarios



Involved Actors



#### Scenario #1 – Uncertified SCADA Assets


Blocking access to uncertified SCADA assets ELECTRON Components: DARCY, ARMY, XL-SIEM, ELECTRON Sharepoint, SDN Controller

**KPIs**: Accuracy of ELECTRON to identify the vulnerabilities of the HMI: > 99%, Time needed to determine the certification status of the HMI: < 10 ms



#### Scenario #2 – FDI Attacks against EV Charging Stations

Detecting and Mitigating False Data Injection Attacks ELECTRON Components: ELECTRON SIEM and its detectors, ISODINE, NIRO, SDN Controller, ELISE KPIs: Detection accuracy of the upcoming fault: > 95%, Restoration time of the nanogrid: < 100 ms





#### Use Case #2: Providing a Resilient Electric Vehicle Ecosystem



#### 4 Scenarios



Involved Actors PPC, IPTO



Scenario #3 – DoS Attacks against EV Charging Stations

Detecting and Preventing DoS attacks ELECTRON Components: ELECTRON SIEM, FL-IDPS, Threat Explorer, ELECTRON Sharepoint


KPIs: Malware threat detection and prevention: 99.9%, Time needed to detect and prevent the malware threat: < 10 ms



#### Scenario #4 – MITM Attacks against EV Charging Stations

#### Detecting and Preventing MITM attacks

**ELECTRON Components**: ELECTRON SIEM and its detectores, ELECTRON Sharepoint, NIRO, SDN Controller, STRONGBOX **KPIs**: MITM attacks detection and prevention: 99.9%, Time needed to detect and prevent the malware threat: < 10 ms.





# Use Case #3: Protecting the Renewables Energy Chain from Cyberattacks and Data Leaking





#### Involved Actors

Enerfin (Operator/Generator), SCHF & SCHE (Manufacturer), Isotrol (Technology provider/Scada Manufacturer), Tecnalia (Research Centre), TUVSPAIN (Certification/Industry).



#### Detecting a number of cyberattacks against Enerfin Wind Farm

**ELECTRON Components:** FL-IDPS, ELECTRON SIEM, ELECTRON SP (MISP), ELECTRON APT Shield, ARMY



#### AR/VR-based Cybersecurity Training

ELECTRON Components: PRINCE

#### Relevant KPIs

KPI#1: Number of critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities detected in assessments and penetration tests; KPI#2 Number of actions proposed for acting in monitoring and control infrastructures in current and in legacy systems; KPI#3 Number of pattern-based detection rules based on IT and OT with alert to control centers; KPI#4 Number of employees trained and certified on the IEC 62443 standard







### ELECTRON

#### 5 Scenarios



#### **Involved Actors**

Transelectrica (Romanian TSO), Electrica SA (Romanian DSO), UPB (Technology Provider)


Scenario #1 – FDI Attacks against Transelectrica and Electrica SA

Detecting and Preventing False Data Injection Attacks **ELECTRON Components:** FL-IDPS, ELECTRON SIEM, ELECTRON SP (MISP), ARMY, NIRO, DARCY, SDN-C, STRONGBOX **KPIs: Detection accuracy** > 90%, **2 Detection False Positive Rate** < 20%, **Intrusion Mitigation Time** < 1 min, **Certification accuracy** > 90%



### Scenario #2 – Unauthorised Attacks against Transelectrica and Electrica SA

Detecting and Preventing Unauthorised Access Attacks **ELECTRON Components**: ARMY, DARCY, ELECTRON SP, ELECTRON Threat Explorer, FL IDPS, ELECTRON SIEM, NIRO, SDN-C, STRONGBOX **KPIs**: Detection accuracy > 90%, 2 Detection False Positive Rate < 20%, Intrusion Mitigation Time < 1 min, Certification accuracy > 90%







### Use Case #4: Proactive Islanding Meets Efficient Threat Detection: Addressing & Mitigating Cyberattacks in the Romanian Energy Chain



#### Scenario #3 – DDoS Attacks against Transelectrica and Electrica SA

Detecting and Preventing DDoS Attacks

**ELECTRON Components:** APT Shield, HaaS (EPES Honeypots), ELECTRON SIEM, NIRO, SDN-C, STRONGBOX

KPIs: Detection accuracy > 90%, 2 Detection False Positive Rate < 20%, Intrusion Mitigation Time < 1 min, Certification accuracy > 90%



### Scenario #4 – APTs against Transelectrica and Electrica SA


Detecting and Mitigating Advanced Persistent Threats **ELECTRON Components**: APT Shield, ELECTRON SP (MISP), ELECTRON SIEM, ELECTRON Threat Explorer, NIRO, SDN-C, STRONGBOX

**KPIs**: Detection accuracy > 90%, 2 Detection False Positive Rate < 20%, Intrusion Mitigation Time < 1 min, Certification accuracy > 90%

#### Scenario #5 – Islanding Schemes and Nanogrid Management Actions - Electrica SA




Applying Islanding Schemes and Nanogrid Management Actions



**ELECTRON Components**: ISODINE, ARMY, ELISE, BEAM, STRONGBOX, **KPIs**: Intrusion Mitigation Time < 1 min, Verifiability of the data integrity up to 100% due to the smart contract mechanism, Traceability, accountability, and non-repudiation of the critical actions in the system will increase up to 80%, Support of turing completeness as regards the business logic of the Information Sharing mechanism will reach 90%





# Thank You

Q/A?



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101021936