

Surrogate-Guided Adversarial Attacks: Enabling White-Box Methods in Black-Box Scenarios

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PRESENTATION STRUCTURE

I

Introduction

Related Work

Contributions

2

Methodology

Experimental Setup

Results & Evaluation

3

Sum up important
Key Points

Future Work

Q/A

Introduction, Related Work & Contributions

INTRODUCTION

Real-world machine learning models are typically black-box:


- ❑ Internal structure and gradients are inaccessible
- ❑ Attackers can only observe input-output pairs via queries

BLACK-BOX

Low transferability
High query cost
Poor performance
on ensemble or non-
differentiable models

WHITE-BOX

High Effective
Require gradient
access
↓
**Not feasible in black-box
settings**



RELATED WORK

2020

Inkawhich et al.

- This work introduced a feature-space adversarial attack that perturbs internal activation patterns of neural networks rather than output logits. By targeting shared internal representations, the attack improves transferability across architectures, making it more effective in black-box scenarios compared to traditional output-layer attacks.

2021

Wang et al.

- This method introduces a way to control the variance of gradient updates during adversarial attack generation. The key idea is to generate perturbations that don't overly align with the surrogate's loss landscape. This balance improves the diversity and transferability of attacks to unseen models in black-box settings.

Wu et al

- Wu et al. proposed a technique that suppresses gradient flow through skip connections (e.g., in ResNets). This reduces the risk of overfitting perturbations to the surrogate model and enhances generalization, resulting in significantly better black-box success rates when transferring attacks between architectures with residual blocks.

2020

Asimopoulos et al.

- This research explores vulnerabilities in AI-based intrusion detection systems used in industrial applications, particularly within the energy sector, and evaluates the resilience of various models like Decision Trees, Random Forests, and MLPs against attacks like FGSM and CTGAN.

2023

CONTRIBUTIONS

Surrogate-Based Black-Box Framework: A structured attack methodology using a neural network surrogate model trained using pseudo-labels to enable effective adversarial generation against XGBoost

White-Box Attack Adaptation: Application of white-box attacks in black-box scenarios through surrogated assisted transfer

Comparative Evaluation: Systematic comparison between the proposed surrogate-based approach and the ZOO black-box attack.

Methodology


METHODOLOGY

Objective

Enable gradient-based white-box attacks in black-box settings by mimicking the decision boundary of the target model



Train a differentiable surrogate model on pseudolabels obtained by querying the black-box model




The main goal is to improve:


- Transferability
- Attack success, and
- Efficiency

On non-differentiable targets

METHODOLOGY WORKFLOW (I)



METHODOLOGY WORKFLOW (2)



#Step 4

Attack Transfer:

- Transfer the crafted adversarial examples to the original black-box model
- Evaluate whether the black-box model misclassifies them

#Step 5

Comparative Evaluation:

- Compare results against standard black-box attacks (ZOO)
- Evaluation based on F1 score, TPR, FPR and Accuracy

Experiment Setup

DATASET OVERVIEW



dataset

Federated OCCP 1.6 Intrusion Detection Dataset

Contains network traffic and labeled data related to cyberattacks on the OCPP 1.6 protocol, designed to support AI-based Intrusion Detection Systems.

Attacks Included

Charging Profile Manipulation

Denial of Charge

Heartbeat Flooding DoS

Unauthorized Access

IEEE DataPort

DATASETS

SUBMIT A DATASET

COMPETITIONS

SEARCH



Datasets

Standard Dataset

Federated OCPP 1.6 Intrusion Detection Dataset



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Data Format: *.7z
*.pcap
*.csv


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Categories: Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning
Power and Energy
Electric Utility
Smart Grid
Security
Energy

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence (AI), Cybersecurity,
Electrical Vehicle, federated learning,
Open Charge Point Protocol

Federated OCPP 1.6 Intrusion Detection Dataset

SETUP & PREPROCESSING




Machine: Macbook Air M2 (Apple Silicon)

Memory: 8GB Unified RAM

Framework: Tensorflow

Dataset Preprocessing



EVALUATION METRICS

Accuracy

$$Accuracy = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FP + FN}$$

True Positive
Rate

$$TPR = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}$$

False Positive
Rate

$$FPR = \frac{FP}{FP + FN}$$

F1 Score

$$F1 = \frac{2 \times TP}{2 \times TP + FP + FN}$$

$TP \rightarrow$ True Positives
 $TN \rightarrow$ True Negatives
 $FP \rightarrow$ False Positives
 $FN \rightarrow$ False Negatives

Accuracy Drop

$$\Delta A = A_{\text{before}} - A_{\text{after}}$$


Transferability
Score

$$T = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{I}[f_{\text{bb}}(X_{\text{adv},i}) \neq y_i]}{\sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{I}[f_{\text{sub}}(X_{\text{adv},i}) \neq y_i]}$$

Results & Evaluation

EVALUATION ON CLEAN DATA

The first step in our evaluation is to assess the performance of the XGBoost model on the clean dataset, before applying any adversarial attacks.



#Step 1


Model: XGBoost

Dataset: Clean Federated OCPP 1.6 IDS

Metric	Score
Accuracy	93.35%
F1-score	93.17%
TPR	93.35%
FPR	1.66%

EVALUATION AFTER BLACK BOX ATTACK (ZOO)

The second step is to apply ZOO black box adversarial attack and evaluate the model on the perturbed dataset



#Step 2

Model: XGBoost

Attack: ZOO

Dataset: Federated OCPP 1.6 IDS

The results clearly demonstrate a significant degradation in model performance under adversarial perturbations. The accuracy of XGBoost drops sharply from its baseline clean performance of 0.9335 to 0.5259 after the ZOO attack.

Metric	Score
Accuracy	52.59%
F1-score	51.34%
TPR	52.59%
FPR	11.85%
Accuracy Drop	40.76%

EVALUATION OF WHITE BOX ATTACK ON THE SURROGATE MODEL

The final step is to apply white box adversarial attack such as FGSM, PGD and BIM and evaluate the model on the perturbed dataset



#Step 3

Model: XGBoost

Attack: FGSM, PGD, BIM

Epsilon: 0.7

Dataset: Federated OCPP 1.6 IDS

	Epsilon = 0.7		
	FGSM	PGD	BIM
Accuracy	59.69%	59.53%	59.38%
F1-score	46.83%	49.07%	46.53%
TPR	59.69%	59.53%	59.38%
FPR	10.07%	10.11%	10.15%
Accuracy Drop	33.67%	33.82%	33.98%
Transferability Score	99.81%	89.12%	69.48%



Conclusions & Future Work

CONCLUSIONS



Surrogate models can effectively bridge the gap between white-box and black-box attack strategies.

The proposed framework allows gradient-based attacks to be applied in non-differentiable black-box settings.



The evaluation results show high transferability, improved efficiency, and significant performance degradation of the target model under attack.

This work highlights the need for robust defences against adversarial threats, especially in critical systems like IDS



FUTURE WORK

Incorporate more complex architectures, including transformers and deep ensembles, to improve decision boundary approximation.

Test the framework against modern countermeasures like: Adversarial Training, Feature Squeezing, and Certified Robustness Techniques.

Investigate model selection strategies to improve attack success while reducing training cost and computational overhead.

Apply the framework in production-like environments, especially for models used on cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and autonomous systems

m Minds



Thank you for your attention!



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